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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, prosecutors hold a significant amount of power in
the criminal justice system. Though many view the arrest as the beginning of
the process, the true beginning of the criminal justice system lies with the
prosecutor and the decisions she makes. The prosecutor can decide to drop
the case, to pursue the case or to give a plea bargain. Though it seems that
there would be strict guidelines for what occurs in that critical stage of the
system, there is not. The prosecutor possesses a substantial amount of
discretion and the final word on most cases.
Recognizing the immense amount of power that prosecutors hold,
scholars have performed a number of studies on discretion and have
expanded our knowledge of the criminal justice system. Many of these
studies have centered on the factors that influence decisions. Studies have
focused on relationships between court officials, prison overcrowding,
conviction rates and a number of other factors that could possibly influence a
prosecutor’s decisions (Cole, Gordon and Huber). While researchers argue
that individual factors have a more significant influence on discretion than
others, it is difficult to be certain since there are numerous factors and since
most of a prosecutor’s decisions take place behind closed doors.
While it is difficult to define the factor that has the most significant
impact on a prosecutor’s discretion, this study examines one of the political
factors. More specifically, this study asks, do selection methods of
prosecutors matter with respect to the community’s desired outcome of a

Valenti 3
case? It is argued that selection methods do matter based on two
assumptions. The first assumption is that prosecutors that are elected will
have a greater stake in pleasing the community and will therefore cater their
discretionary decisions to the community’s interest. The second assumption
is that prosecutors who are appointed will have less of an interest in pleasing
the community since they will not be up for reelection and will therefore not
tend to the community’s interests.
To measure the impact of selection methods, this thesis conducts a case
study of two cities, Worcester, Massachusetts and Hartford, Connecticut. The
case study helps analyze how elected and appointed prosecutors handle
violent crimes cases. This thesis utilizes this method since scholars have
failed to examine how prosecutors act in individual cases and whether such
actions are related to how they are selected. This study considers three
different scenarios, “Husband Murders Wife,” “Child Rape,” and “Murder of a
Child By a Non-Stranger.” Categorizing these scenarios is particularly crucial
to this study. The two cases that are included in each scenario are carefully
selected to ensure that the similarities between the two cases far outweigh
the differences. By selecting cases that are similar, this study is able to
compare them and suggest that the only major difference, the selection
method of the prosecutor, is the reason for their differing outcomes.
Utilizing these methods, the findings demonstrate that selection
methods do matter. In Worcester, where public sentiment is expected to play
an important role in the prosecutor’s decisions, it does, in all three scenarios.
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In Hartford, where public sentiment is not expected to play an important role
in the prosecutor’s decisions, it does not, in two out of the three scenarios.
The findings of this study contribute to current studies on prosecutors
by determining if the community is a significant political factor in the
decisions of prosecutors. It also allows scholars to determine if there are
discrepancies between prosecutors at the state level who are elected or
appointed. Both of these determinations are necessary to the study of
prosecutors. A focus or lack of focus on the community and potential
discrepancies in selection methods has implications for the criminal justice
system with respect to justice. Prosecutors that focus all of their attention on
community desires and ignore the rights of defendants may not be seen as
upholding justice. Similarly, prosecutors that focus all of their attention on
the rights of the defendant and not on community desires provide the
criminal justice system with an unjust balance of the law.
It is often argued whether the criminal justice system is in need of
change. Some scholars argue that the amount of discretion prosecutors hold
is necessary to their job (American Bar Association 1970), while others argue
that there needs to be limits on that discretion (Angela Davis, Rainville). By
examining this pressing issue and searching for irregularities in the criminal
justice system, this study helps discover whether the role of prosecutor in the
United States should be subject to change.
This thesis begins with a background of the United States criminal
justice system. A history of prosecutors, definitions of key terms and an
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overview of the two cities are described. Next, an analysis of past and
current literature is provided to gain an understanding of theories already put
forth on prosecutors as well as to identify the places were information is
lacking. The next section is the design of the study. Variables are defined
and over all methods are explained. Next, the results of the study are stated
and analyzed. Finally, conclusions about selection methods and the criminal
justice system in general are suggested.

BACKGROUND
The following information is important to this thesis as it provides a
sense of how prosecution has evolved in the United States and where it is
today. This section examines the role of the prosecutor throughout history
and the positions that they hold today. Knowledge of how the role of the
prosecutor has changed is necessary to understanding the importance of
selection methods. This section also examines the two cities that are used as
case studies in this thesis. Knowledge of how each city’s criminal justice
system operates is also necessary to understanding the importance of
selection methods of prosecutors. The background sub sections include:
History of Prosecutors, United States Prosecutors, Hartford, Worcester and
Drawing Comparisons.
History of Prosecutors
The United States criminal justice system derives its origins from
English common law. The colonists, newly settled in America, continued
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some of the same practices that were present in England. They also modified
the system to fit their new needs and to step away from the problems they
had experienced in England. The colonists made prosecution public. Public
Prosecution is the thought that when a crime is committed, the state
recognizes it as a crime against the entire state and so provides the
prosecution. In public prosecution, the state seeks justice on behalf of the
victim (Worrall 5-7).
Public prosecution was first adopted by Connecticut in 1704 (IronsGuynn 5). Initially, the selection method for all local prosecutors was by
appointment. The local courts and governors were responsible for the
appointments (Irons-Guynn 5). The role of prosecutor was not seen as a
significant role and so many state governments failed to include the method
by which they were appointed in their state constitutions (Rainville 14).
Nevertheless, local prosecutors were appointed and in 1780 the role of
District Attorney was created in the Judiciary Act of 1780, again with an
emphasis on appointment (Irons-Guynn 6).
When Jackson took the presidency in 1820, “there was a push for
increased democratization, including a push for elections rather than political
appointments” (Worrall 7). Giving in to the push for a more democratic
process, “Mississippi amended its constitution, in 1832, to add a provision for
the election of local prosecutors” (Irons-Guynn 5). By the early 1900’s local
prosecutors in each state with the exception of “Alaska, Connecticut,
Delaware, the District of Colombia, New Jersey, Rhode Island and the outer
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islands of Hawaii” were elected (Rainville 36). Local prosecutors that had
originally been treated as a part of the judiciary were now being considered a
part of the executive branch due to their election status (Worrall 7). The
switch of selection methods from appointment to election was a significant
milestone in prosecutorial history. The new selection method marked a
significant shift in power within the criminal justice system that greatly
impacted how the courts worked back then and still work today.
Prosecutorial power in the United States was initially insignificant in
the early courts. This “power” is also known as prosecutorial discretion.
Discretion is defined by scholars as the decision to take a certain course of
action and more specifically, for a prosecutor to decide when to charge a
person with a crime (Angela Davis 12; Kenneth Davis 4; Irons-Guynn 6). In
the early history of the prosecutor, discretion was severely limited. The
prosecutor was considered a “minor public official” (Rainville 14). The
prosecutor was seen as an extension of the court and so the courts were given
the most power. Even the sheriff and coroner at one point were upheld with
more respect (Worrall 8).
When the selection method of the prosecutor changed from
appointment to election, prosecutors gained a significant amount of power
and made numerous discretionary decisions. The intended purpose of the
change in selection was to hold the prosecutors accountable to the public
(Angela Davis 165). Now, the prosecutors had to worry about reelection and
therefore cater their decisions to the public. While this was respectable
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reasoning, prosecutors began making the majority of the decisions. According
to Worrall, “They went from having very limited power to almost limitless
power” (8). After the change from appointment to election, the prosecutor’s
office began to grow with the growing population of the country. Scholars
and other officials began to recognize the true power that the prosecutor held.
This recognition led to a call for prosecutors to be subject to review.
However, the American Bar Association struck down the idea in 1970.
Rainville notes the following: “The American Bar Association stated that the
decision to initiate criminal proceedings needed to be entrusted to a
professional, public official” and so the prosecutor’s level of discretion was
justified (18).
The amount of discretion that prosecutors hold is still a point of
contention today. Some scholars call them “the gatekeeper[s] to the justice
system” (Rainville 17). Others blatantly state the failures associated with the
growth of discretion. Angela Davis claims, “The electoral process has not
served as an effective mechanism for holding prosecutors accountable to their
constituents” (183). These scholars also call for reform and suggest the public
be given more information on the inner workings of the prosecutor’s office or
prosecutors be subject to review boards (183).
In more recent years, prosecutors, self aware of the amount of
discretion they hold, have begun to reach out to the community. Finding its
origins in the community policing movement, the community prosecution
movement has taken greater shape in recent years. Community prosecution
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is noted as a “cultural change” as well as a response to the court’s “inability to
control crime and their lack of responsiveness to citizens’ needs” (Thompson
338-340). Rainville describes community prosecution by saying, “The goals of
community-based prosecutors, in theory, turned from attaining criminal
convictions to solving community problems and addressing quality of life
concerns” (20). Prosecutors have left their offices and begun to work closer
with police and other attorneys in order to solve the problems on the street
before they reach the court (Thompson 345). Changes in the criminal justice
system such as this have lead to other implications for the criminal justice
system in the United States.
The underlying concerns associated with prosecutorial discretion are
often labeled as due process and crime control (Packer). Due process is a part
of the American criminal justice system that looks out for the rights of the
accused. Herbert Packer describes this in terms of prosecuting a criminal
case. He says that it is the process by which the court officials cannot move
forward with a case unless they are absolutely sure that the accused is guilty.
Any hole in the evidence or any blemish in the case is not tolerated (Packer 68). Alternatively, crime control is the advancement of a case such that the
prosecution can obtain the maximum amount of criminal convictions. Packer
also explains this in terms of case advancement. He says that a prosecutor
must do all that she can to get a conviction and that the conviction process
should be methodical and speedy (Packer 4-6). Both of these models are
constantly at odds and have had an interesting history in the United States.
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The evidence seems to suggest from the on-set that America has been
concerned with crime control. The switch from private to public prosecutors
suggests certain elements of the crime control model. As noted previously,
public prosecution suggests that a wrong has not been done solely to the
victim, but to the entire state. The theory being that the public entrusts the
prosecutors to deliver justice on their behalf. More recently, the United
States has seen the impact of the “tough on crime” mentality (Rainville 19). In
the 1980’s and 1990’s the United States saw record incarceration rates.
Officials became concerned with the increase in prison volume and began to
recognize that the people being incarcerated were not “career criminals” and
were not committing crimes that warranted the amount of people in the
prisons (Rainville 20). This recognition brought on moderate change.
Community prosecution and the prosecutor’s interest in pleasing the
community started to become more important.
Today, community prosecution and a focus on due process are more
prevalent than they were in the past. There are still signs that crime control
is still an important part of society. This is apparent in the media and reports
on prison overcrowding, particularly in Connecticut and Massachusetts
(Quarterly Report on the Status of Prison Overcrowding, Third Quarter 2009;
“Report to the Governor and Legislature”; “Eyewitness News 3”). However,
current literature on prosecution indicates a switch from crime control to due
process. The growing number of studies on community prosecution, the
recognition of prison overcrowding by state officials and the complaint by
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officials that the court system is too busy suggests that the 21st century is
moving toward Packer’s due process model. The United States currently
stands at a cross roads between the move to due process and the temptation
to continue the ways of the past.

Prosecutors in the United States
The United States has two types of prosecutors, federal and state. The
highest authority on federal prosecution in the United States is the Attorney
General. The Attorney General for the United States is appointed by the
President and serves as a part of his cabinet. The Attorney General is the
head of the Department of Justice and is the “chief law enforcement officer of
the Federal Government” (United States Department of Justice). It is his
responsibility to give legal advice to the President and represent the federal
government in court. The current Attorney General is Eric H. Holder Jr.
Serving under the United States Attorney General are the United States
Attorneys. They are also a part of the Department of Justice and are
appointed by the President. The United States Attorneys are federal
employees that serve to represent the federal government in each state
(United States Department of Justice). The current United States Attorney for
Connecticut is David B. Fein and for Massachusetts is Carmen Milagros Ortiz.
At the state level, an Attorney General is present for each of the 50
states. According to the National Association of Attorney Generals, “The
Attorney General is popularly elected in 43 states, as well as in Guam, and is
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appointed by the governor in five states” (National Association of Attorneys
General). The Attorneys General for each state are considered the “chief legal
officers” and “serve as counselors to state government agencies and
legislatures and as representatives of the public interest” (National
Association of Attorneys General). Attorneys General are typically responsible
for civil cases. Both Connecticut and Massachusetts elect their Attorneys
General. The current Attorney General for Connecticut is George C. Jepsen,
elected as a Democrat. The current Attorney General for Massachusetts is
Martha Coakley, also elected as a Democrat.
The prosecutors that this study is mainly concerned with are also state
employees. These prosecutors are called District Attorneys. District
Attorneys are responsible for handling criminal cases that occur in their
district. In Connecticut, there are thirteen States Attorneys that serve as the
main prosecutorial power for their district. The current States’ Attorney for
the Hartford District is Gail Hardy. In Massachusetts, there are eleven
District Attorneys that also serve as the main prosecutorial power for their
district. The current District Attorney for the Middle District (Worcester) is
Joseph Early. Additionally, each District Attorney maintains Assistant
District Attorneys. These attorneys take on cases in each district and report
to the District Attorney. The Assistant District Attorneys are typically put in
control of their own cases and have a significant amount of authority in the
criminal justice system. While the Assistant District Attorneys maintain their
own discretion on cases, it is important to note that they are typically in
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contact with the District Attorney who supervises them and has the ability to
fire them. For the purposes of this study it is important to note that the
Assistant District Attorneys are representatives of the District Attorneys and
the things that they do in court are a representation of the District Attorney
and the way he or she wants the cases to be prosecuted.

Hartford
Founded in 1636, Hartford, has a population of about 124, 512 as of
2006. Hartford is made up of 17 square miles and has 7,023.6 persons per
square mile. The median household income is about $25,000 and per capita
income is about $13,000. About 61% of the people that live in the city are
high school graduates with 12.4% going on to achieve a Bachelor’s degree or
higher. The percentage of people living below the poverty line is 30.6%.
Hartford has a mainly Democratic political culture. In the presidential and
senatorial elections from 2000-2008 the city’s registered voters elected the
Democratic candidate ("Election Results and Related Data").
In 2009 Hartford reported 1,603 violent crimes to the Uniform Crime
Reports ("Offenses Known to Law Enforcement by State by City"). The state
of Connecticut reports high levels of imprisonment and is currently in the
process of suggesting ways to minimize prison overcrowding (“Report to the
Governor and Legislature”; “Eyewitness News 3”). Also important to
Connecticut’s legal environment is the acceptance of the death penalty for
capital felonies.
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Hartford abides by Connecticut’s criminal justice system as found in
Article 23 of Connecticut’s state Constitution. The Constitution allows for the
Division of Criminal Justice whose mission it is “…to contribute to the due
process of criminal law and achieve justice” (State of Connecticut Division of
Criminal Justice). Article 23 of Connecticut’s Constitution also establishes a
Criminal Justice Commission. The Criminal Justice Commission is
“…comprised of the Chief State’s Attorneys and six members appointed by the
Governor…” Additionally, and most important to note for the purposes of
this study:
“The Criminal Justice Commission is the hiring authority for all
prosecutors. Thus, unlike other states where prosecutors are elected,
all of Connecticut’s prosecutors are selected, based on merit, by and
independent commission” (State of Connecticut Division of Criminal
Justice).

Included among the selections that the Commission makes are the State’s
Attorneys. Connecticut is comprised of thirteen districts and thus the
Commission is responsible for the appointment of thirteen State’s Attorneys.
The current members of the Criminal Justice Commission are, The Honorable
Richard N. Palmer, The Honorable Thomas A. Bishop, Maura Hughes Horan
Esq., Garrett M. Moore Esq., Ann G. Taylor Esq., Alfred A. Turco Esq., and
Chief State’s Attorney Kevin T. Kane.
The current State’s Attorney for Hartford is Gail Hardy. Hardy was
appointed by the Connecticut Criminal Justice Commission on August 1, 2007
for an eight year term. Prior to her appointment, Hardy served as a probation
officer and public defender. Attorney Hardy served the Criminal Justice

Valenti 15
Commission in Waterbury as Deputy Assistant State’s Attorney (1996),
Assistant States Attorney (1998), and a Senior Assistant State’s Attorney
(2006). The majority of the publicity surrounding Attorney Hardy’s
appointment centered on her racial background. According to the
Connecticut Criminal Justice Commission, Hardy is “the first African
American appointed to the position of State’s Attorney in Connecticut
history.”
Since judges frequently interact with prosecutors and therefore
contribute to the criminal justice process, it is important to have an idea of
their backgrounds as well. In Connecticut, judges are appointed with the
exception of probate judges. Judges are appointed for a period of eight years.
When that time is up they can choose to apply for reappointment. The
similarity in selection methods for prosecutors and judges suggests that they
may have the same interests with regard to how they conduct their cases.

Worcester
Founded in 1713, Worcester, as of 2006 has a population of about
175,454. Worcester is made up of 37 square miles and has 4,596.6 persons
per square mile. The median household income is about $35,000 and per
capita income is about $18,000. About 76.7% of the people that live in the
city are high school graduates with 23.3% going on to achieve a Bachelor’s
degree or higher. The percentage of people living below the poverty line is
17.9%. Worcester has a mainly Democratic political culture. In the
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presidential and senatorial elections from 2000-2008 the city’s registered
voters elected the Democratic candidate (“Election Results”).
In 2009, Worcester reported 1,790 violent crimes to the Uniform Crime
Reports ("Offenses Known to Law Enforcement by State by City"). The state
of Massachusetts also reports high levels of imprisonment, about 100%-150%
in each prison (Quarterly Report on the Status of Prison Overcrowding, Third
Quarter 2009). Unlike Connecticut, Massachusetts does not offer the death
penalty for felonies but offers life in prison.
Worcester follows the Massachusetts criminal justice system as stated
in Article 19 of its Constitution. Article 19 states,
“The legislature shall prescribe, by general law, for the election of
sheriffs, registers of probate, [commissioners of insolvency,] and clerks
of the courts, by the people of the several counties, and that districtattorneys shall be chosen by the people of the several districts, for such
term of office as the legislature shall prescribe” (Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts).

The elected District Attorneys in Massachusetts are supported by the District
Attorney’s Association. The District Attorney’s Association is a state
organization whose mission “…is to support the District Attorneys in
promoting public safety, the fair and effective administration of justice, the
education of prosecutors and the safeguarding of victims’ rights” (District
Attorneys Association).
The current District Attorney for Worcester is Joseph Early. Attorney
Early was elected District Attorney “with 78 percent of the vote on November
7, 2006” for a four year term ("Office of District Attorney Joseph D. Early,
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Jr."). According to a report by the Secretary of the Commonwealth, 259,570
people voted in the District Attorney, which is about 35% of the Middle
District’s population (Galvin 47). While this seems low, midterm elections are
known for obtaining a lower percentage of voter turn out. These numbers
still suggest that the public could have an impact on District Attorney Early’s
decisions.
From the information present on his website, Attorney Early is an
experienced attorney and has a significant amount of experience working for
the state of Massachusetts as well as popularity among his constituents.
Prior to his decision to run for District Attorney for Worcester, “Early served
as an Assistant District Attorney in Hampden Country” (1985-1988) ("Office of
District Attorney Joseph D. Early, Jr."). He served “in the trial division of the
state Attorney” (1988-1990) and “ran his own law office” (1990-2007). He
additionally “represented the commonwealth as a special assistant attorney
general” (1990-2007) ("Office of District Attorney Joseph D. Early, Jr.").
Judges in Massachusetts are not elected. Instead, all judges are
appointed their positions for life and must retire by age seventy. The
difference between the ways both of these officials are selected suggests that
they may have different motives when conducting their cases. For our
purposes, the fact that judges are not elected, but appointed for life time
appointments suggest that they will be less inclined to make statements
merely to please the public.
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Drawing Comparisons
Connecticut and Massachusetts share a few similarities in their
criminal justice systems. Both Connecticut and Massachusetts have a board
of officials that oversee the District Attorneys. Additionally, both Gail Hardy
and Joseph Early are experienced attorneys that have worked in their
respective governments for years. Significance, however, lies in their
differences, which are more apparent and more abundant.
By looking at the Connecticut government website, it is apparent that
there is a focus on appointment and administration. The press release
congratulating Attorney Hardy that appears on the Criminal Justice
Commission’s website focuses mainly on the Commission and their decision
to appoint Attorney Hardy. The article includes statements about how the
decision was difficult for the Commission and how it was a unanimous vote
by the Commission. The article ends with a listing of the Commission
members. Furthermore, Attorney Hardy does not have a website to list
current projects she is working on or what she wishes to accomplish.
The Massachusetts District Attorney Association, which oversees the
Massachusetts District Attorneys, lists the District Attorneys on their website,
but does nothing more. Instead there is a link that leads to Attorney Early’s
private website. On Attorney Early’s website there is a plethora of
information about himself, upcoming events he will be attending and current
press releases of cases he is working on. It appears as if Attorney Early is
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more responsible for informing the community with what he is working on
and what he wishes to accomplish.
It is necessary to compare the type of information that these two states
and their respective District Attorneys provide the public. From the
information provided on each government’s website, certain conclusions can
be drawn. Connecticut’s focus on the Criminal Justice Commission rather
than Attorney Hardy suggests a focus on administration. Attorney Early’s
choice to make his own website suggests a focus on constituents. The
broader and most important point here is that the methods of selection in
each state provide very different environments for District Attorneys to work
in.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Among scholars, discretion within the United States criminal justice
system is a widely discussed topic. In Discretionary Justice, Kenneth Culp
Davis, generally defines discretion: “A public officer has discretion whenever
the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among
possible courses of action or inaction” (4). There is an attempt by many to
analyze the relationship between those officials that hold discretion and how
the law should be executed (Gordon, Sanford and Huber; Cole; Angela Davis,
Kenneth Davis; Johnson; Rainville; Thompson). One public official that has
received significant comment on the amount of discretion that she holds and
how that discretion is executed is the prosecutor. Much of the criminal
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process either ends or begins with the decisions made by the court’s
prosecutor (Angela Davis 23). Since these officials are expected to uphold
both a “crime control” and “due process model” in applying the law fairly, all
of the subjective factors that contribute to their decisions may seem
surprising (Packer). One such variable is the way in which prosecutors are
selected. While the majority of district attorneys are elected, few are also
appointed to the position. This has caused questions to be raised among
scholars about how prosecutors make their decisions. While prosecutorial
discretion has been largely discussed in the literature, there is a lack of focus
on the discrepancies that arise between elected and appointed prosecutors.
The relationship between the electorate and elected prosecutors versus those
that are appointed will be most relevant to this study.
The definition of discretion given by Kenneth Davis above is an
important way to define the topic since it is clear, concise and applies to all
officials practicing discretion. Scholars looking to define discretion solely for
prosecutors however typically use a more detailed definition. These
definitions are typically defined as Angela Davis defines discretion in
Arbitrary Justice: the Power of the American Prosecutor. She defines the
prosecutor’s discretion as fulfilling the following, “…whether an individual
should be charged, which charges to bring, and whether and how to plea
bargain” (12). These criteria for a prosecutor’s discretion are widely accepted
by numerous authors (Gordon and Huber; Cole; Johnson).
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A reoccurring theme with regards to prosecutorial discretion is found
in the language of the definitions. The definition by Kenneth Davis includes
the word “inaction” at the end and the definition by Angela Davis implies that
a prosecutor may make the decision not to prosecute the full charge. Both of
these references to a failure to prosecute are no doubt purposeful. In fact,
“almost all criminal cases are resolved with a guilty plea by the defendant”
due to the decision not to prosecute, which typically infers a plea bargain
(Angela Davis 43). The choice not to act has not only been noted in general
prosecutorial research but in specific areas of the law such as mandatory
minimum cases. These are cases in which the defendant would have been
required to receive at least a minimum sentence (and possibly a much harsher
one) had it been brought to a judge. Researchers found that almost half of the
cases eligible for a mandatory minimum sentence did not receive that
sentence (Ulmer, Kurlychek and Kramer 430). Considering that the majority
of cases are not prosecuted, but rather negotiated by way of plea bargain,
scholars have focused a lot of their attention on determining the factors that
influence the prosecutor’s decision to act or not to act.
The first consideration, among the many reasons why a prosecutor may
choose to decide a case, is found in the facts of the case. Johnson labels this
as “the prosecutor’s reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty” (6).
The thought behind this criterion is three fold. First, people generally do not
like to wrongfully convict others of crimes (Gordon and Huber, “Citizen
Oversight” 344). Second, if the prosecutor suspects that the defendant is not
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guilty and then takes the time to process the case, it is a waste of time for the
court that is forced to sift through a large number of cases (Packer 4). Third,
the prosecutor’s reputation is at stake when choosing which cases to
prosecute. If the case goes all the way to court and there is not sufficient
evidence to back it up or it has a high probability of losing the prosecutor
cannot obtain a conviction. Obtaining a conviction on a case is a key
determinate in a prosecutor’s reputation (Gordon and Huber, “Political
Economy” 143). Next, “the extent of the harm caused by the offense” is also
considered (Johnson 6). Similar reasoning applies here. A case that did not
cause a lot of damage does not need to be prosecuted if it can be solved by a
simpler negotiation process since prosecutors must make sure that in
controlling crime they practice efficiency (Packer 4).
Another criticism of the way in which prosecutors decide to prosecute
is examined by looking at the relationships that occur within the court. One
of the most notable examinations of these relationships comes from George
Cole in his article “The Decision to Prosecute”. Cole states, “The need for the
cooperation of other participants can have a bearing on the decision to
prosecute” (332) and as a result, his research of the King’s County Prosecutor’s
office in Washington finds that “most decisions resulted from some type of
exchange relationship” (333). He finds that the interactions between the
prosecutors and the police, the judges, the prison wardens, the defense
attorney and the community all have an impact on the prosecutor’s final
decisions. Some scholars go so far as to point out that in some cases police
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“shopped around” to find an assistant in the office that “ would regard their
requests for warrants most sympathetically” (Miller 16). In his study on
relationships, Cole also makes reference to one last practical consideration
also presented by Misner (720). Cole quotes a judge from King County, “
‘When the number of prisoners gets to the ‘riot point’, the warden puts
pressure on us to slow down the flow” (337). Though it may not seem right
that our justice system in part depends on prison capacity, this is just another
consideration in the decision to charge a person with a crime.
The identification of all the possible ways a prosecutor can be
influenced to act has taken up the majority of the research done on
prosecutors and their decisions. The most common theme among these
studies is the involvement of community. Whether there is a brief mention or
an entire article devoted to it, the opinion of the community is a major factor.
Cole, in “The Decision to Prosecute”, devotes a whole section to “community
influentials” (340). He says that prosecutors consider what the people want
so that the community’s objectives are realized and so it allows them to think
favorably of the prosecutor. He says prosecutors ask themselves “ ‘will a
course of action arouse antipathy towards the prosecutor rather than the
accused?’” (341).
Additionally, though not mentioned directly, community’s influences
also have a part in the models as defined by Herbert Packer. Packer’s
criminal control model is based on the idea that the prosecutor works for the
people. The model provides that the people in the community know that a
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wrong has been done to them. Through a proper prosecution, which in this
model should end in conviction, the wrong can be turned into a right. In
other words, “the criminal process is a positive guarantor of social freedom”
and so the public’s grievances should be attended to (4).
More recently, prosecutors have begun to embrace society’s
perspective and have become involved in a program called “community
prosecution.” Scholars are embracing this idea in showing how prosecutors
are becoming more and more accepting of the public’s needs. Community
prosecution finds its origins in both community policing and community
courts (Thompson 339-341). Prosecutors have recently gotten on board and
are attending to the public’s needs by going out into the community and
addressing their issues before they come to the court (Irons-Guynn 12-16;
Rainville 33). In some areas of the country, prosecutors have embraced the
community prosecution movement so much that “attending neighborhood
events and meetings held by other institutions” has become the norm
(Thompson 346). Prosecutors are going above and beyond to make sure
community needs are attended to.
Prosecutorial involvement in the community can be difficult to
measure. In a study of community prosecutors, Rainville measures a
prosecutor’s involvement in the community based on her choice to report that
she participates in community prosecution (36). While this method allows for
data that comes directly from the source, it is troublesome in that the
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prosecutors could embellish their involvement in order to better their
reputation.
Prosecutors are aware of the community’s role in their profession.
However, a lot of community’s influence according to community prosecution
is occurring outside of the courtroom. To determine how deeply the
community’s suggestions resonate within the system and if the community
really has control over the prosecutor’s decisions in the courtroom scholars
have focused on the selection methods of prosecutors.
Among district attorneys in the United States an overwhelming
majority are selected by process of election. Only a few, “Alaska, Connecticut,
Delaware, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and the outer
islands of Hawaii, local chief prosecutors are appointed” (Rainville 36). This
difference in selection method has larger implications for accountability.
There has been a significant amount inquiry into the relationship between an
elected official and her electorate (Gordon and Huber, “Incumbent Behavior”;
Ferejohn). Many have come to the conclusion that in order for an official to
obtain election or in many cases reelection, she must or should address the
needs of her constituents. For instance, in the case of judges in a Kansas
court, Gordon and Huber found that when they were running against an
opponent the judges gave out more convictions (which is what the public
valued) than when they were running unopposed (133). This relationship is of
course not one sided. In order to get what they want from officials, the
electorate is a part of the same game. A study of incumbent officials in
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elections by John Ferejohn found that when voters are deciding if they should
vote for the incumbent they should make their decision based on the
incumbent’s past performance. If they focused on past performance in
making their decision to vote then the candidate would continue to support
the community’s interests. If the voters ignored the past actions of the
incumbent when reelecting him/her then the incumbent would be less likely
to consider the public’s needs (Ferejohn 18). Both of these examples are ways
in which researchers have examined the relationship between officials and
their constituents.
In order to examine the relationships described above, researchers
have used various methods. The most notable is the study by Gordon and
Huber, “The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior.”
Gordon and Huber focused on a unique feature of Kansas in which there were
judges that were elected and others that were appointed. They noted the
most and least severe choices that both groups of judges could make. Next,
they observed the decisions that each set of judges made and were able to
conclude that there were stricter sentences set by the groups that was up for
reelection (117-118). The advantage of this study is that in comparing the
two groups of judges the authors were able to control for confounding
variables since the study was focused on officials in the same state.
More recently, there has been a focus on the selection of prosecutors.
In attempting to define that relationship one study has attempted to define
the “responsiveness” of prosecutors to the community’s needs by measuring
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how many prosecutors report having practiced community prosecution
(Rainville 36). While the study controls for other possible variables that could
effect the prosecutor’s decision to try charges, it relies on self-reporting of the
prosecutors, which leaves room for error. Other studies have focused on the
idea of conviction rates as a way for prosecutors to get reelected. This comes
from the idea that “popular wisdom suggests that prosecutors, when seeking
reelection, must cultivate the public image that, as guardians of public safety,
they are ‘tough on crime’” (Gordon and Huber, “Citizen Oversight” 335). These
authors find that the public will use conviction rates in order to measure how
well the prosecutor is doing her job. While it is a well-proven point, the study
briefly mentions that their results can be applied to appointed officials as well
through threat of a lack of future reappointment.
The role of appointees in the community-prosecutor relationships
needs to be studied further. Additionally, in their later study, Gordon and
Huber note that, “A skeptic could counter that the average voter is largely
unaware of the conviction rates of his or her local prosecutor” (Gordon and
Huber, “Political Economy” 143). In that same study the authors once again
hint at the similarities between elected and appointed prosecutors by saying
that a failure to hand out the “correct” judgments could result in “significant
political fallout” (152). But whether the appointed officials are really on the
same level that the elected officials are when it comes to community
standards is still left unaddressed. The studies mentioned above have
different methods of measuring how elected officials are held responsible to
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the community and tend to believe that it is a system that works. Others
seem to disagree. Some argue that elected prosecutors do not represent the
public sufficiently due to problems such as “low voter turnout” and that
“voters need far more information than they are presently provided” (Angela
Davis 183). Though many scholars in agreement that elected prosecutors are
held responsible there is still relevant point to be made to oppose that view.
To see if the idea that elected prosecutors can be held responsible to
the views of their constituents Gordon and Huber suggest the study of “wellpublicized cases” (153). Their mention of “well-publicized cases” alludes to
the influence of the media. The media of course, has not been ignored in
defining the election process. In particular, Angela Davis criticizes the media
and television for the way in which it defines how the public views the
criminal justice system. She argues that most Americans learn about
prosecutorial roles through popular television shows and through the cases
the media chooses to cover (173-176). Her view of the media’s role is that it
mainly influences opinions on what the public thinks about the prosecutor.
This is also the view to other authors who look at the media in relation to
incumbent performance (Rainville 73). The media have been defined in this
sense as a way for the public to view the prosecutors. The media is rarely
discussed as a way for the prosecutors to view the public. When Gordon and
Huber mention “well-publicized cases”, there is an implication that these
cases are important to the public and therefore are the cases that prosecution
should focus on.
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Lastly, scholars have focused on the larger implications of how
prosecutors use their discretion. This is largely a part of Herbert Packer’s
“Two Models of the Criminal Process.” In this article, he discusses a crime
control model and a due process model. According to Packer, “The Crime
Control Model is based on the proposition that the repression of criminal
conduct is by far the most important function to be performed by the criminal
process” (4). Alternatively, “The Due Process Model insists on the prevention
and elimination of mistakes” in order to protect the defendant (7). We can
therefore imply that the crime control model is the model that speaks most to
the community. It reasons that the community in order to protect its
structure must make sure that crime is kept to a minimum and when crime
does occur the defendant must be punished. For prosecutors, this means that
they should prosecute to the fullest extent of the law. The due process model
on the other hand follows the reasoning that an individual must be protected
from the criminal process. The due process model says that the system must
be absolutely sure about the guilty conviction before it proceeds to convict
the individual. For prosecutors, this leads to a greater amount of plea
bargains. The struggle between these two lines of reasoning can be found in
scholar’s debate over prosecutor’s selection and the discretion they hold. For
instance, some scholars have called for more lenity in the criminal justice
system. Noticing the vast amount of discretion that a prosecutor holds the
purpose behind lenity is “limiting the possibility of arbitrary
interpretation…and providing equal protection” (Hester 517).
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Another example of where these models may apply is in the mandatory
minimum study done by Ulmer, Kurlychek and Kramer. As previously stated,
in this study the authors found that mandatory minimums were not being
applied as frequently as was warranted due to prosecutorial discretion (430).
From that conclusion one might suggest that if mandatory minimums are not
being applied then prosecutors in that state are favoring the due process
model over crime control.
These two models are also nicely applied to the differences in selection
of officials. Again the study of the judges in Kansas serves as an example
(Gordon and Huber, “Incumbent Behavior” 133). In this case, the fact that the
judges were elected affected their decision to apply the crime control model
over the due process model, whereas the judges in that same Kansas court
that were unopposed may have chosen a more balanced version of the two
models. The idea of crime control versus due process once again appears in
community prosecution. Speaking on the rise of the community prosecution
movement, Thompson notes that people have supported community
prosecution because of “what they perceive as a tendency on the part of the
prosecutors to be insufficiently sensitive to victims’ needs” (344). The
community prosecution movement then can be seen as a public outcry for
more crime control. In continuing to research how the selection methods of
prosecutors impacts how they use their discretion, these two models will
continue to be a present force.
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From the present research it is clear that prosecutorial discretion has
become a topic of interest mostly because it plays a huge role in defining the
outcome of cases in the criminal justice system. A large number of scholars
have focused their attention on the factors that contribute to the prosecutor’s
decisions (Cole; Angela Davis; Gordon, Sanford and Huber; Johnson;
Rainville). Most studies allude to or directly mention that one of the ways a
prosecutor makes her decisions is by taking community objectives into
account. In focusing upon the community, the differences between selection
methods of district attorneys have become relevant. Disparities between the
way elected and appointed prosecutors choose to practice their discretion
have been determined and have had larger implications for the community as
well as the individual. While scholars have looked into prosecutorial
discretion and selection methods, there is a need for a better look at specific
cases where the relationship between selection method, the community and
prosecutors can be addressed. The next step in examining this relationship is
to determine if differences in the practice of discretion can be found in the
study of individual cases, particularly those that force the public opinion of
the case upon the prosecutor.

RESEARCH DESIGN
Discretion as a factor in a prosecutor’s decisions has been well
identified by researchers. Authors have tended to focus on discretion with
respect to outside variables that affect it (Gordon and Huber; Johnson;
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Packer). These variables have ranged from the relationships a prosecutor
holds within the court to the amount of overcrowding in state prisons (Cole
337). In order to quantify discretion, current research has tended to focus on
how conviction rates are the main indicator. There is an assumption made by
researchers that in order to satisfy the public, a high conviction rate is
necessary (Gordon and Huber, “Citizen Oversight” 335). While many of these
studies have contributed insight into the relationship between a prosecutor
and her discretion, there is a lack of studies that focus on selection method as
a factor that impacts a prosecutor’s discretion. Keeping selection methods at
the forefront, this study will focus on three factors that are absent from
previous research.
The first of these factors is that there is a lack of comparative study
between elected and appointed prosecutors. As a matter of fact, appointed
prosecutors at the state level are rarely subjects for discussion. This is
reasonably so, since there are few appointed prosecutors at the state level.
However, the District Attorneys in states such as Connecticut and New Jersey
have “flown under the radar” without comment for a long time. The next
factor absent from current research is an alternative way to measure public
needs. The public’s opinion of prosecutors in previous research designs is
typically labeled as being solely concerned with conviction. For most studies,
this is a fair assumption to make. The public wants to be sure that the
attorneys are working to eradicate crime and conviction rates are a measure
of that work. However, this may not apply to appointed prosecutors. In
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states where prosecutors are appointed, it is not likely that the community
will have widespread access to conviction rates so there must be another
method of determining public opinion of prosecutors that can be applied to
both the elected and appointed cases. Lastly, current studies do not focus on
specific cases. Once again, the conviction rates are used as measures of
discretion. A study of individual cases that both appointed and elected
district attorneys have prosecuted could prove to be valuable to the
measurement of their discretion.
This thesis employs a comparative study. Two cities, Hartford, CT and
Worcester, MA are used as case studies. The selection method of State’s
Attorneys in Connecticut is by appointment and the selection method of
District Attorneys in Massachusetts is election. In each state three court
cases are chosen. These cases are violent crime cases that have appeared in
the media in the past three years. These cases are considered and referred to
as “high profile cases.” The three types of violent crimes cases that this study
examines are: “Husband Murders Wife,” “Child Rape,” and “Murder of a Child
by a Non-Stranger.” Each case is reviewed based on how the District
Attorney handled the case and what the public’s desired outcome of that case
was. In order to do this, the assumptions and data that warrant this type of
study must be explained.
This study incorporates aspects from Gordon and Huber’s research on
judges in a Kansas Court titled “The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on
Incumbent Behavior.” Their study takes a comparative look at judges in
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Kansas, some who are appointed and others who are elected. Though the
authors do find the same discrepancy between the judges that this study
asserts will be found between prosecutors, there are other aspects of the
model that prove useful (133).
The first method that is adopted in this study is the idea of
geographical closeness. In the study by Gordon and Huber, one of the benefits
of choosing to do a comparative study within the state is that it allowed them
to control for outside variables. They say the study is at an advantage
because “the legal environment in which those officials operate” is similar
(Gordon and Huber, “Incumbent Behavior” 108). Furthermore, in their study
they also collect data on the demographic of the districts. This study adopts
both of those methods. Hartford, Connecticut and Worcester, Massachusetts
are chosen as cities of interest because they are geographically close, share
the same demographics and have similar political climates. These
characteristics are important to assuming a similar “legal environment” and
similar public needs (108).
Though not in the same state as each other, Hartford and Worcester are
only separated by a little over 50 miles and share much of the same cultural
history. A view of their demographic also speaks to their similarity. A
collection of data from the Census in 2000 puts the population of Hartford at
124, 512 and the population of Worcester at 175,454 making them a few of
the largest cities in their respective states. The Census data also indicates
that their median household incomes are similar, $25,000 for Hartford and
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$35,000 for Worcester. The percentage of high school graduates is between
60-80%, and people living below the poverty level is between 20-30%. Each
city has a decent amount of minority populations, however Worcester has a
larger white population at 77.1%. Though there are slight differences
between the two cities, they are overall similar ("U.S. Census Bureau").
Since this study deals with the community and the outcomes they
desire on high profile cases, it is important to get an idea of the political
culture that each city holds. Political culture is determined by examining
election results from the past three Presidential elections and past five Senate
elections. In 2000, 2004 and 2008 both Hartford and Worcester voted for the
Democratic candidate in the Presidential election. Additionally, in each of the
U.S. Senate elections from 2000 to 2008 both Hartford and Worcester voted
for the Democratic candidate each year ("Election Results and Related Data";
“Election Results”). From these results it is safe to say, at least for the past 5
years, both cities wanted their city to be run by Democratic policy. This
again proves the similarities of each community.
Additionally, this has implications for the laws that prosecutors employ
when choosing to prosecute a defendant. Since both cities hold a similar
political culture, it is likely that in the passing of major legislation similar
ideals have been employed and so the legal codes are not drastically different.
This, however, does have one exception. Connecticut currently allows the
death penalty as an option for punishment, while Massachusetts does not.
This is not an issue in this study and is explained later in this design.
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Next, it is necessary to make certain comparative assertions about
each of the court systems. There are four main aspects of the courts that
have stood out to researchers in the past when discussing a prosecutor’s
discretion. These things are: the number of violent crimes in each state, the
caseload of the court, prison overcrowding and prosecutor’s own beliefs. In
order to compare Hartford and Worcester, these factors should be similar in
each court system otherwise they could have a confounding impact on the
implications of selection methods on discretion.
The level of violent crimes in both states is nearly the same. According
to the Uniform Crime Reports, the amount of violent crime cases in Hartford
in 2009 was 1,603 and the violent crimes cases in Worcester were at 1,790
("Offenses Known to Law Enforcement by State by City"). If these crime rates
are examined in relation to their respective populations, violent crimes in
each city account for .01% of crime per person. So even though Worcester has
about 50,000 more people, the crime rates are similar. It is important to note
that the Uniform Crime Reports are not fact. Instead the numbers collected
come from the individual reporting of each state. This could potentially leave
room for error (over reporting or under reporting). In any case, the reports
indicate that Hartford and Worcester both report a similar amount of violent
crime in their cities. Once again, both cities are similarly ranked.
Prison overcrowding is an identifiable problem for both states. This is
a necessary factor to control for because if one city has a lot of room in their
prison then the prosecutor may not feel the need to hold back on full
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convictions like a prosecutor that is working with an overcrowded prison
system. Hartford and Worcester do not differ in this aspect. Both
Connecticut and Massachusetts report problems with prison overcrowding.
In a Massachusetts report on overcrowding, the Department of Correction
notes that they are past capacity (100-150%) in most prisons and suggests
ways in which they are solving the problem (Quarterly Report on the Status of
Prison Overcrowding, Third Quarter 2009). In Connecticut reports on
overcrowding, the Department of Corrections suggests ways to solve the
problem but leaves the magnitude of the problem up to the press that reports
that some prisons are growing by 800 people during the summer alone
(“Report to the Governor and Legislature”; “Eyewitness News 3”). For
prosecutors, this means that there may be a chance that they are not looking
to put people in prison and may hold back on convictions, but for now it is
good to know that both states are on an equal playing field.
In addition to how many violent crimes cases the court must deal with,
scholars are concerned with determining the caseload of each court. A heavy
caseload suggests that prosecutors may wish to be more efficient with moving
cases through the court. A light caseload suggests that prosecutors may wish
to spend more time on their cases. Caseload poses a potential problem for
this study. The Hartford Superior Court reported a caseload of 3,819 criminal
cases from 2009 to 2010 (“CT Judicial Branch Statistics”). The Worcester
Superior Court only reported a caseload of 727 criminal cases in 2009 (“Fiscal
Year 2009 Statistics”). This difference cannot be ignored.
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However, these statistics, when combined with statistics on prison
overcrowding, evoke a completely different meaning. Though Hartford
Superior Court claims far more cases that Worcester, both cities state that
they have widespread prison overcrowding. When it comes to a prosecutor’s
decisions these two factors must be considered together. Alone, the caseload
data for Hartford suggests that prosecutors will want to offer plea bargains in
order to move cases through the system and that prosecutors in Worcester
will have more time to prosecute cases if need be. However, if the caseload
data is combined with the fact that each state reports a significant amount of
prison overcrowding, other conclusions can be made. Both Hartford and
Worcester cannot afford to send people to prison. Even though Worcester
may have more time to prosecute a defendant it does not mean that they will
offer fewer plea bargains. As will be seen later in this study, this reasoning
proves true and in both cities plea bargains are offered more often than not
even if there is a difference in the time it takes to prosecute the case.
It is also a concern that the personal beliefs of the District Attorneys
may play a part in determining a case. This becomes a problem when the
views of the District Attorney are not similar to those of the community.
There is evidence, however, that this is not the case. As previously stated,
both states have voted for the Democratic Party in the majority of past
elections. It is not an exaggerated assumption, then to claim that the views of
the District Attorney are likely to be similar. This is true of the District
Attorney for Worcester, Joseph Early, who was elected with an affiliation to
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the Democrat Party. Though Gail Hardy, State’s Attorney for Connecticut,
was not able to run under a political party there are factors that indicate that
her beliefs align with the Hartford community. Hardy worked in the
Waterbury District Attorney’s office prior to her appointment. Waterbury is
another city known for electing Democratic candidates. Additionally, after
her appointment she received support from State Representative Minnie
Gonzalez, Majority Whip at large for the Democrat Party ( " Minnie Gonzales
Newsroom”) .
Two other aspects of a prosecutor’s discretion that must be addressed
are relationships within the court and extent of harm of the crime being
considered. For the sake of this research design it is assumed that there will
be various relationships between the District Attorney and other officials in
both courts. The time it would take to study these relationships is far beyond
the parameters of this study. The extent of harm that is caused by a case is
typically also considered when a prosecutor makes decisions. The cases that
appear in the media and that the public is most concerned with tend to be
violent crime cases and so the scope of the harm involved is narrowed.
When choosing which court cases to examine, this study again borrows
theory from Gordon and Huber. When explaining their model, Gordon and
Huber note that citizens in the community become most aware of court cases
when they are “high-profile trials” (110). Following their study, this study
will examine “high profile” cases that make their way to the prosecutor’s
office. Three court cases from both Hartford and Worcester that occurred in
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the past three years are chosen. The time period from 2007 to 2010 will be
examined since District Attorney Joseph Early was elected to Worcester in
2006 and decisions made before that would have been by a different District
Attorney. Additionally, Hartford’s District Attorney, Gail Hardy was
appointed in 2007.
In order to choose the violent crime cases for each state this model
assumes that the media is an accurate representation of the public’s desired
outcome of each high profile case. To choose which cases are deemed “high
profile” the cases chosen from each city have a significant presence in the
media. In fact, the cases chosen for this study are cases that have appeared in
the city’s local media three or more times. These cases are found by
searching through the archives of various local news sources to discover
which cases have a strong media presence. Another requirement for the cases
that are chosen is that they must provide a cohesive public sentiment and
must show how the prosecution responds to that sentiment.
This study looks for coverage of the case in the local newspapers as
well as in television media. The major source examined in Hartford is The
Hartford Courant with supporting articles found in the Connecticut Post,
MSNBC, News 8 and West Hartford News. The major source examined in
Worcester is the Worcester Telegram and Gazette with supporting coverage
found in the Boston Globe, Boston Herald, CBS Boston, Milford Daily News
and My Fox Boston. This study is not concerned with national newspaper
sources since the issues most important to a particular community are not
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always worthy of the national news and are not likely to give many details on
local cases. A mention in a national news source such as the New York Times
or Washington Post however, demonstrates a high level of concern
surrounding a particular case and is not ignored.
The articles chosen from each newspaper are then examined for signs
of the public’s desired outcome and the action taken by the District Attorney.
This depends solely on the wording of the articles. In each article there are
signs that the prosecutor is aware of and concerned with the public’s desired
outcome for each case. One of these signs is how strong the public’s concern
for the case is based on statements given in the articles. In order to say that
there is a unified desired outcome the statements must be illustrative of that.
Within each article, the majority of people quoted must have the same
opinion. A news article that has three opinions for conviction and two
opinions against conviction cannot be counted as a unified opinion.
Additionally, this study acknowledges other statements given by actors
in the case’s proceedings that may influence public sentiment. For instance, a
statement from a judge on a particular case that is reported to the media and
therefore heard by the public holds some significance in the public’s view of
the case. A judge who tells the media and the community that the defendant
needs to go to prison has the opportunity to influence what people think the
conviction should be for the defendant. A culmination of statements from the
community, the judge and even the defendant can signal a unified public
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attitude about what the outcome of the case should be. They are taken into
account since each of these opinions has an impact on the case.
Another sign that is examined in the articles is if the prosecutor is
quoted in the article him or herself. A statement given by a District Attorney
that says something to the effect of “this case has struck a chord with the
community” or “the city will not stand for this type of crime” is seen as an
admission by the prosecutor that he or she is concerned with the public’s
needs. A statement with vague wording such as “my office is doing the best it
can to bring about justice” cannot be counted as indicating concern for the
public’s needs.
To actually determine if the District Attorneys are responsive to the
public’s needs the outcome of the case is also a consideration. The outcomes
for each case are that it is dropped, given a plea bargain or prosecuted to the
fullest extent. It must be stated here that “prosecuted to the fullest extent” is
relative for each state. The fact that Connecticut has a death penalty and
Massachusetts does not is not an issue since only the maximum sentence for
each state is considered. Once the public’s desired outcome and the actual
outcome are identified it is determined if the public had any say in the course
of action taken. Furthermore, by tallying the amount of times each District
Attorney acted on behalf of the public’s vocalized needs it is determined
whether elected prosecutors are more likely than appointed prosecutors to
listen to the public.

Valenti 43
The potential outcomes of this study suggest that examining the
relationship between the selection of District Attorneys and the community
through a case study has larger implications for the criminal justice system at
the state level. This study seeks to find that there is a difference between
how appointed District Attorneys handle the community’s opinion of
individual cases and how elected District Attorneys handle the community’s
opinion of individual cases. This difference is assumed solely on the idea of
reelection. A number of studies have been done on the lengths that a public
official will go to get reelected (Ferejohn; Gordon and Huber). The idea here is
that elected District Attorneys are more attentive to the community. The
elected prosecutor is more willing to prosecute the case the way the
community wants so that when reelection comes around the public is
satisfied with what the prosecutor has done with each case. Alternatively,
appointed District Attorneys do not have to agonize over how the public
wants a case prosecuted since she does not have to worry about reelection.
This discrepancy, if proven, could greatly impact our view of the
criminal justice system based on Herbert Packer’s Crime Control and Due
Process Model, as discussed previously. For instance, if it is found that
elected District Attorneys always prosecute cases based on public sentiment
of the case then this is harmful to due process. If this scenario is true, then
elected prosecutors are not serving justice, but are merely seeking reelection.
If it is found that appointed prosecutors always act of their own volition
without consideration of public needs, then there is also a cause for concern.
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A District Attorney who is focused on her own view of the criminal justice
system may end up evoking too much due process or too much crime control.
As citizens of the United States, there seems to be an assumption that there
will be a balance of both crime control and due process when a case is
brought to court. If selection methods of District Attorneys are inhibiting
either crime control or due process, then we have a right to know and an
obligation to fix it.
Furthermore, this study has implications for the selection status of
prosecutors in the future. Discretion is a pressing issue among scholars since
it gives prosecutors the power to determine exactly what goes on in the
criminal justice system. The study of discretion and suggestions for how it
should be used help ensure fairness and justice. The determination of how
much discretion elected and appointed prosecutors hold will allow scholars to
suggest which selection methods offer the defendant the best chance at
justice. Discretion that has a negative impact on the criminal justice system
cannot be allowed.
Selection status for prosecutors was initially changed from
appointment to election so that they may be held more accountable to the
public (Angela Davis 165). If appointed prosecutors are not held accountable
to the public then the states with appointed prosecutors might consider
changing their selection status. It is also possible that prosecutors have
become too accountable to the public and so there may be an important
reason why some states continue to use appointments.
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All in all, this study looks for a correlation between selection methods
and discretion. It suggests that appointed prosecutors use a significant
amount of discretion (since they are free from the public’s opinion) while
elected prosecutors use slightly less discretion (since they must cater to the
public’s opinion). This relationship is examined in the following cases.

RESULTS
First Set of Cases: Husband Murders Wife
In 2007, in Worcester, Joseph Ventola was charged with murdering his
wife, Ester Ventola. Joseph, 64, and Ester, 60, had been married for 18 years.
Police reported that Ventola called 911 and told the operator that he had
stabbed his wife. Shortly after, he was arrested and charged with first-degree
murder. He was held without bail and appointed public defender, James G.
Reardon Jr. In court, he initially pleaded not guilty to the murder charge.
Police noted that he did not have a previous criminal record. Joseph Ventola
was initially charged with first-degree murder, which would have carried a
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. However,
prosecutors offered him a plea bargain and in 2010 he pleaded guilty to
second-degree murder and was “sentenced to life in prison with the
possibility of parole in 15 years” (“My Fox Boston”).
In 2009, in Hartford, Jose Lacouture, was charged with murdering his
wife, Gina Lacouture. Jose, 32, and Gina, 23, had a 3-year-old son together.
Reports of the murder suggest that the couple was fighting when Jose
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stabbed and killed Gina. When police arrived on the scene Lacouture
admitted that he had killed his wife. Jose was provided with public defense.
West Hartford News states that one of the defenders was William O’Connor
(Dempsey). Police reported that they had been called to the Lacouture house
in the past for problems that they were having and that Gina was dealing
with mental illness.
Lacouture was charged with murder, risk of injury to a child and
violating a protective order in the killing of his wife. The murder charge
alone could have carried a life sentence or death penalty. In 2010, Lacouture
was given a plea bargain by the prosecution. He pleaded guilty to first-degree
manslaughter under the Alford Doctrine, a type of plea bargain in which the
defendant admits that the prosecution has enough evidence to prosecute but
does not force the defendant to admit his guilt. The prosecution asked for 10
years from the judge, however, he was sentenced to 5 years.
Though from two different states, these two cases are very similar.
Both Ventola and Lacouture are accused of killing their spouses. They are
both charged with first-degree murder, appointed public defenders and
initially plead not guilty. Later, each defendant is offered a plea bargain by
the prosecution and they take the deal, incurring lesser sentences. There are
of course a few differences between the two defendants such as age and
previous police contact, but these are minor differences. Another difference
is found in the actual sentences. Both faced life sentences; however,
Lacouture is sentenced to five years in prison while Ventola incurs the life
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sentence with possibility of parole. Both sentences made by plea bargain, but
one much greater than the other.
The pattern of how the public responds to the cases is also similar. In
each case, the support for the defendant by the public is abundant. In Joseph
Ventola’s case, the media began reporting on his case immediately. From the
arrest in 2007 to the conviction in 2010, the case is reported on in twelve
separate articles. Reports of the case appear in the Worcester Telegram and
Gazette, The Boston Globe, The Milford Daily News, My Fox Boston and CBS
Boston. These articles not only report the facts but also give numerous
opinions on the case by people that know the Ventolas. The quotes from each
of these articles provide a cohesive sentiment of the case. The public
sentiment is that Joseph Ventola is not a bad guy. He made a mistake.
A 2007 article from the Worcester Telegram and Gazette demonstrates
the first glimpse into the public’s feelings of Joe Ventola. At the beginning of
the case, numerous character witnesses speak out on Ventola’s behalf. Ms.
Bradford, a neighbor of the Ventolas, says, “They kept to themselves” and
“They were nice people” (Foskett). In the same article, a friend of Ester
Ventola, Sally Seekings, says, “This is not true” (Foskett). Further, The
Milford Daily News finds many supporters of Joe Ventola. An article reports
that friends of Ester Ventola “recall her husband…as a patient and supportive
companion” (Laczkoski). A friend of Joe Ventola, Bob Konetzny, calls him
“smart”, “patient” and “a very likeable guy” (Laczkoski).
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When the trial begins in 2010, a quote appears in The Milford Daily
News from a friend of Ester Ventola. Joan Doran says of Joe Ventola, “I hope
you suffer every minute of every day” (O’Connell). This negative sentiment,
however, is over shadowed by quotes given by the police chief and the
victim’s brother. In the Boston Globe, the police chief speaks out about his
view of the couple and the responses he received from the community, “’It's a
shock not only for the neighborhood but everyone, including us’” (Ranalli).
Most importantly, during court proceedings, Ester Ventola’s brother does not
show hatred, but instead says, “I know deep down, you miss Esther as much
as we do, Joe… We will not be hateful, but forgiveness is not yet to be”
(Croteau, “Husband Stabs Wife”). The majority of the statements given by
family and friends are supportive of the defendant and show the prosecution
that there is not a call for revenge.
The same support is present in Lacouture’s case. This study examines
six articles about the case. These articles appear in the Hartford Courant,
West Hartford News and “News 8.” Public support for the defendant is
prevalent in each of the new sources. During the trial, the Hartford Courant
out right states the amount of support that was seen for the defendant. The
article states: He received “pleas for leniency from 18 people, including victim
Gina Lacouture's parents. No one called for harsh punishment” (Dempsey).
Public support for Jose Lacouture is so important to the decision making
during the case that the Judge issues a statement, “Gold said he had never
seen such an outpouring of support for a defendant, ‘with much of that
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support coming from the victim's mother herself’” (Dempsey). The Courant
reports that friends of his had traveled from Pennsylvania and Colombia to
support him. Additionally, the West Hartford News reports that people
described Jose Lacouture as “a hard worker who worked from dusk until
dawn for his family” (Kloczko). The statements given by Jose’s family, friends
and even the Judge suggest that this is a horrible mistake. It is not a crime
that deserves a harsh sentence.
Also found in the media for each case is the prosecutor’s opinion and
decision on how to handle each case. The prosecutors in the Ventola case and
in the Lacouture case both arrive at the decision to allow a plea bargain. In
Ventola’s case, Assistant District Attorney Sarah Richardson states, “’The
commonwealth believes this sentence is reasonable based on the feelings of
the victim’s family, the age of the defendant and the current health concerns’”
(O’Connell). This statement recognizes that the opinion of the family is taken
into consideration by the prosecution. Furthermore, the Telegram and
Gazette obtains a reaction by District Attorney Joseph Early while court is in
session. During the proceedings, a video of Joe and Ester is shown to which
Early responds, “It was very unique. It was on a number of different levels.
It was very personal. I think everyone was affected by that” (Croteau,
“Husband Stabs Wife”). District Attorney Early’s quote demonstrates that he
is sympathetic to the situation and does not suggest that Joe Ventola is a
threat to the community.
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In Lacouture’s case, the prosecution understands the public’s call for
forgiveness, and though they do not release a statement, their actions suggest
forgiveness. Initially, Lacouture is charged with murder, which could have
led to life in prison. As the case moves forward, however, and people begin to
support Lacouture, the prosecution allows a plea bargain. Even though they
ask for a greater sentence than the judge ultimately assigns it is likely that the
pressures from the public have an impact here. Once again, as the Courant
reports, “No one called for harsh punishment. The state had asked for a
sentence of 10 years” (Dempsey).
Both the prosecutors in the Ventola and Lacouture cases allow a plea
bargain after hearing the public’s call for a reduced sentence. Though they
come to the same final result a difference still exists between the two courts.
The prosecutors in Worcester claim more of a media presence and give the
public sound reasoning for what they decide. The prosecutors in Hartford
allow a plea bargain but do not allow the media to capture much of the
thought process behind the deal.

Table 1: Comparing Prosecutorial Actions in Cases Where “Husband
Murders Wife”
Facts
Public’s
Prosecutor’s
Sentence
Response
Response
-stabbed wife Strong
plea bargain
life in prison
Worcester
to
death
support
for
with
(Ventola)
-admitted
defendant
possibility of
guilt
parole in 15
immediately
years
to police
-stabbed wife Strong
plea bargain
5 years in
Hartford
to death
support for
prison
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(Lacouture)

-admitted
guilt
immediately
to police

defendant

Second Set of Cases: Child Rape
In 2009, in Worcester, 33-year-old Juan Nazario was charged with
numerous counts of child rape and pornography. Nazario worked at a
daycare and was accused of assaulting anywhere from 50-120 children. He
was held on $250,000 bond. He was appointed pubic defense attorney
Michael S. Hussey and it was later reported that his attorney was Alexei C.
Garick, also a public defender. Evidence of this accusation was found in
pictures, videos and a journal that Nazario kept. According to the Worcester
Telegram and Gazette, “Prosecutors allege Mr. Nazario committed those
offenses from about December 2006 to about June 7 of last year”
("Telegram.com").
A press release on District Attorney Early’s website states that Nazario,
“had been indicted on 10 counts of rape of a child with force; 11 counts of
posing a child in a state of nudity; 15 counts of photographing an
unsuspecting nude person; 18 counts of possession of child pornography; and
one count of indecent assault & battery on a child under 14” (“Office of
District Attorney Joseph D. Early, Jr.”). The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts General Law Section 22A states anyone who commits child
rape with force “shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life
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or for any term of years” ("The 187th General Court of The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts"). In 2010, Juan Nazario was sentenced to 40 to 45 years in
prison.
In 2009, in Hartford, Jack Boyko was charged with sexually assaulting
two young girls on numerous occasions. The prosecution stated that the girls
had been abused from when the were about 5 years old until their mid teens.
The prosecution also noted that the girls he assaulted were not his first. In
fact, he had assaulted two other children before this case. Boyko was
appointed a public defender, R. Bruce Lorenzen.
According to the Hartford Courant, “He'd pleaded guilty to two counts
of first-degree sexual assault and two counts of risk of injury to a minor in
October” (Owens, “Manchester Man Gets 17 Years”). To get an idea of the
typical charge for this type of crime, Connecticut General Statute suggests,
“ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the
court if the victim is under ten years of age” (Chapter 952* Penal Code:
Offenses). Boyko was given a plea bargain in 2011. The prosecution asked for
the maximum under that plea bargain, which was 20 years in prison,
however, the judge sentenced him to 17 years in prison.
These two cases are comparable since both cases deal with child rape
by an older male, both acts occur multiple times and both defendants
eventually admit their guilt. Additionally, the people involved in the cases
prove that they are disturbed by the accusations and the judges provide
statements reiterating that sentiment. The main difference between the cases
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is that Nazario molested numerous children over the years while Boyko
exploited two young girls over many years.
In both cases, public attitudes of the defendant are clear. There is no
support for either of these defendants. The Nazario case appears in the
Worcester Telegram and Gazette, My Fox Boston, CBS Boston, The Boston
Globe and The Boston Herald. This study examines six articles on the case.
Public attitudes surrounding this case are found in a few different ways. CBS
Boston reports that Nazario lived in a neighborhood with a lot of children.
When his neighbors hear the news, they are shocked and disturbed. One man
is quoted as saying, “I know the guy was there doing child pornography. I
mean little five year olds. It was like kids!” (“CBS Boston”).
Additional sentiment of this case comes from other actors involved in
the case, the defendant, the defense and the judge. Nazario writes the
following in his journal, “I’m a monster. Seriously. I molest kids” (Murray,
“Convicted Child Monster”). Additionally, instead of saying that his client was
sorry for what he had done, Nazario’s attorney states, “He’s sickened by what
he did” (Murray, “Convicted Child Monster”). Each of these quotes suggests
the seriousness of the crime. These statements demonstrate how a broad
scope of people hint to the prosecution that this is not a case that can be
ignored. Finally, recalling the public attitudes of the case, the judge states the
following during the sentencing phase, “Judge Lemire said Mr. Nazario
‘preyed on the weakest and most defenseless victims imaginable’ and
described his crimes as ‘egregious’” (Murray, “Convicted Child Monster”). The
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judge’s ability to recount public sentiment as a reason for the harsh sentence
during the sentencing phase is evidence that opinions are unified and strong
during this case.
Criticism of Boyko is similar to that of Nazario. Boyko’s case appears
numerous times in the Hartford Courant and also in the Connecticut Post and
Boston Globe, demonstrating that the details of this case reached a significant
number of people. This study examines six news articles regarding the case.
Public attitudes from this case come mostly from the mother of one of
the girls. The Hartford Courant reports, “The mother of one of Boyko's
victims said his crimes affected not only the girl he abused but her siblings.
They have experienced a multitude of emotional problems” (Owens,
“Manchester Man Gets 17 Years”). The family’s opinion in this case is present
in multiple news sources and has the possibility to influence the prosecution’s
decision. Though Judge Gold comments after the prosecution has made its
decision, the Judge’s statement goes to show how powerful the family’s
attitudes were at the beginning of the trial. His statement mirrors the
family’s earlier statement, “Gold told Boyko his crimes called for severe
punishment, and that the children will continue to suffer for years to come”
(Owens, “Manchester Man Gets 17 Years”).
Up until this point there have been numerous similarities in these two
cases. The area in which they differ is the most significant to this case study.
The way in which the prosecution recognizes public sentiment and how they
choose to act on that sentiment is very different in the Nazario case than in
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the Boyko case. This difference demonstrates the differences in discretionary
use when prosecutors are selected in different ways.
In Nazario’s case, the prosecution is very perceptive to the public’s
feelings and makes this known in both how they handle the case and the
quotes they release to the public. Assistant District Attorney Anthony
Marotta “called Mr. Nazario’s crimes ‘vile’ and ‘disgusting’” (Murray,
“Monster Guilty”). Furthermore, District Attorney Early, releases a statement
on his website stating, “This self-described monster has now been taken off
the street…He will be placed behind bars, where he belongs, for a very long
time” (“Office of District Attorney Joseph D. Early, Jr.”). Due to the strong
call for conviction and the prosecution’s recognition of that call, Nazario is
sentenced to 40 to 45 years in prison.
In Boyko’s case, something much different occurs. The prosecutors
show that they understand the public’s feelings but they do not act on that
understanding. The Hartford Courant reports, “Assistant State's Attorney
Anthony Bochicchio told Gold that among the sexual assault cases he's
handled during his 15 years as a prosecutor, Boyko's were the worst” (Owens,
“Manchester Man Gets 17 Years”). He is also quoted as saying, “‘I can't recall
a more upsetting case than this one’… Worse, the prosecutor added, was that
Boyko had been convicted of sexually assaulting a child before” (Owens,
“Manchester Man Gets 17 Years”). These statements from the prosecuting
attorney make clear that he recognizes how upsetting the case is to everyone.
He even goes so far as to say that it is the worst case he has handled. This
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kind of recognition from the prosecutor suggests that he is willing to be tough
on crime and send Boyko to prison for many years. This, however, does not
happen.
Boyko receives a plea bargain for his crimes. The prosecution suggests
that he be given the maximum allowed by the deal, which is 20 years. In the
end, however, the judge sentences him to 17 years. For a case that was the
worst that Bochicchio had ever seen, it seems that the punishment does not
fit the crime. One last insight into this case comes from the judge who
reduces the sentence by three years for not making the girls have to go
through a long trial. This is an interesting statement since the judge made it
in the final stages of the case and not by the prosecution as a reason for the
plea bargain.
In this piece of the case, both prosecutors recognize that the
community does not want either of the defendants to get a reduced sentence.
In Nazario’s case, the prosecutors listen to the public and impose a full
sentence. In Boyko’s case, however, the prosecutors offer a plea bargain.
There is one piece of evidence found in the media for why Boyko’s
prosecution does this. In the sentencing stage the judge says that he will
lower the sentence from 20 years to 17 years since the girls will not have to
go through a trial that will make them relive their experiences. This could
potentially be seen as a reason for why the prosecution is willing to give
Boyko a plea deal. However, if the prosecution truly cared about the public’s
opinion they could have issued a statement for why the plea bargain was
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being allowed. Instead, it is the judge who provides the public with this
reasoning after the fact.
Additionally, it is apparent that the children involved in the Nazario
case are not left out of the process and must endure hearing all of the things
that they were put through while the investigation is going on. If the
prosecution for the Nazario case is able to do it successfully, it seems possible
for the prosecution for Boyko to do it as well. This difference between the
two cases suggests that there is a difference between how appointed and
elected prosecutors view and use their discretion.

Table 2: Comparing Prosecutorial Actions in Cases Where “Child Rape”
Facts
Public’s
Prosecutor’s
Sentence
Response
Response
-assaulted
No support
case
40-45 years
Worcester
50-120
for defendant prosecuted
in prison
(Nazario)
children
-admitted
guilt in court
assaulted
No support
plea bargain
17 years in
Hartford
two young
for defendant
prison
(Boyko)
girls for
many years

Third Set of Cases: Murder of a Child by Non-Stranger
In 2007, in Worcester, Michelle Lepkowski was charged with assault,
battery and reckless endangerment of a child. Further into the investigation,
she was charged with murder of her two-year-old child Raelynn Mascal. It
was alleged that Lepkowski had caused severe injuries to her child by beating
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her when the child was disobedient. Lepkowski’s boyfriend, Luke Malizia,
was arrested for being present when the crime was committed and not
stopping Lepkowski from killing her daughter. She was appointed a public
defender, Michael S. Hussey, for the initial stages of the case and eventually
hired Barry P. Wilson. It was also suggested in court that Lepkowski was
suffering from mental health problems.
Even though the prosecution sought a murder conviction, which could
have ended in a life sentence, in 2010 a jury convicted Michelle Lepkowski of
involuntary manslaughter. Lepkowski was sentenced to 12 years and 7 years
probation. The prosecution had asked for a sentence up of 20 years while the
defense asked for the sentence to be minimal but to include probation.
In 2008, in Hartford, Yalines Torres was charged with the murder of a
child she was babysitting, Elijah Gasque. Torres was said to have been taking
care of the child when she put him in a sleeping bag and swung him around
the room, ultimately resulting in a head injury and death of the child.
According to authorities, Torres changed the story of how the child died
numerous times. Torres was held on one million dollars bail and was
appointed public defender Claudia Jones. Later it was reported that she was
being represented by Robert Babcock.
In 2009, Torres agreed to a plea bargain that allowed her to plead
guilty to manslaughter. Had the trial gone on, Torres was facing life in prison
or the death penalty. After her plea agreement, she was sentenced to 16 years
in prison and 5 years probation.
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The facts of these cases make them comparable. Both cases include the
murder of a small child by a constant caregiver. The way that the murder
occurs is initially questioned in both cases. Additionally, the amount of
public support for each defendant is similar.
Public support for both Lepkowski and Torres is lacking. Lepkowski’s
case is reported on numerous times in the Worcester Telegram and Gazette
and makes a few appearances in the Boston Globe. This study examines a
total of seven articles regarding this case. The public attitudes in these
articles are unrelenting except for one friend of Lepkowski, “He said he does
not believe she could have intentionally harmed the child. ‘Every time I saw
her with the child, she was always a loving mother’” (Barnes and Bruun).
Despite this vote of confidence given by her friend, Jason Jeleniewski, the
public is shocked and disappointed. A neighbor of Lepkowski’s states, "I felt
horrible when I heard about it," "I was in shock when I heard about it"(Barnes
and Bruun). A former co-worker of Lepkowski’s seems to capture the feeling
of the public in the quotes she gives to the Telegram and Gazette. On her way
into court she mirrors the shock and confusion of the people in the room and
says, “She doesn’t seem to be that type of person” (Barnes and Bruun). On her
way out she provides another statement to the paper, “I don't think there
should have been any bail at all," "I'm going home now and kiss my girls”
(Barnes and Bruun). Another friend of Lepkowski, Christine Moulton, states,
"I just want justice for their baby," "Nobody should have to endure what that
baby went through" (Barnes and Bruun). Speaking for the child’s father,
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Patrick Mascal, Moulton says, “He's in shock. He's a father that lost
everything" (Barnes and Bruun). In later articles, Mascal also speaks out, “My
daughter is gone. She will never come back to me." (Croteau, “Mom Gets 12
Years”).
Finally, the Worcester Telegram and Gazette reports a statement from
the judge that mirrors the feelings of the public, "It is all about Michelle. That
is who Michelle cared the most about," Judge Kenton-Walker said. "There is
no sentence that is going to bring back this child." (Croteau, “Mom Gets 12
Years”).
Despite statements of initial shock and confusion by people that knew
Lepkowski, the statements remain full of revenge. There is a call for justice.
Though Lepkowski may have had one or two supporters at her trials, many,
including her own friends we not supportive of her actions.
The Torres case is reported on by many different news sources. Five
different articles are examined for this case. Articles appear in the Hartford
Courant, News 8, MSNBC, and the New York Times. Each of these articles
provides a unifying opinion of the Torres case. Just like in the Lepkowski
case, Torres is supported by one of her friends. Mayra Velazquez reports,
"She's a good mother.” "She takes care of her kids" (“msnbc.com”). Aside from
this woman however, there is significant public distaste for Torres. Much of
the negative support came from the family of the child. The following was
the mother’s response to the crime:
“Right now, you are getting away with murder, I hope in your dreams
you are tormented forever. To be told your son has a fractured skull
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and blood around his brain. To look down at your baby and see the
bruises and his eyes rolling around in his head like loose marbles..."
(Santillo).
It is clear from this statement that Julie Atkins, the mother of Elijah, is asking
for
retribution. Not only does she evoke emotion with her statement, but she
also tells
the defendant that she should not get off easy. She also tells the New York
Times that Torres had been her friend however, “the murder charge ‘lightens
my heart a little’” (Stuart). Negative sentiments for Torres are seen in this
report by a local news station, “Gasque's family didn't speak at Torres' hearing
on Wednesday, but they made it clear that they don't feel the deal is tough
enough” (“Eyewitness News 3”). The many sources that report on the Torres
case seem to agree that there is not a sense of forgiveness in this case. Torres
goes from a family friend to a murderer to the Gasque family.
Once again, these two cases differ in how the prosecution responds to
the public’s pleads. The prosecutors in the Lepkowski case act on the public’s
feelings while the prosecutors in the Torres case cast the public’s feelings
aside. Prosecutors on the Lepkowski case act according to the opinion that
the public presents. Assistant District Attorney, Paula Frasso, says of the
incident, “The defendant is not a mother, she was a monster and it was
evidenced that day” (Croteau, “Mom Gets 12 Years”). The language that
Frasso uses indicates that she is catering her opinion to the public. She strips
Lepkowski of her “mother” title and labels her a “monster.” These are terms
that are intended to invoke a certain emotion. Frasso basically reports that
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she is aware that Lepkowski’s acts were heinous and that she will be doing
something about it. Frasso follows through with what she indicates in her
statements and does not allow a plea bargain but charges her with murder.
The murder charge given by the prosecution is not found by the jury.
Instead, the jury convicts Lepkowski of involuntary manslaughter and she is
sentenced to 12 years and probation. The actual conviction in this case is not
as important as in previous cases since the prosecution does not determine
the conviction. In Lepkowski’s case, the public speaks out against her and the
prosecution seems to take the public’s opinion into account when Frasso
releases her statements and then asks for a murder charge.
The prosecution does not seem to follow the prevalent sentiment of the
Torres case. The New York Times reports on one of the first statements given
by the prosecution, “State prosecutor, Sandra Tullis, said the state ‘believes
we have a strong case,’ but declined to comment further” (Stuart). As the case
goes on and the family continues to speak out, the prosecution does not
provide the media with any more statements. The prosecution offers Torres a
plea bargain and she takes it. It is clear that the family does not agree with
their decision, but the prosecution does not seem sympathetic. One of the
prosecutors on the case, Donna Mambrino, states the following:
“We recognize that neither one of them are satisfied with this
disposition, but the state is confident with our combined 80 years of
experience for the four of us that this has led to a just resolution,"
Mambrino said (“Eyewitness News 3”).
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The prosecution recognizes that they have not made a popular decision. It is
clear that these decisions are not about popularity but about what the
prosecutors determine is justice.
Yalines Torres is sentenced to 16 years in prison and 5 years probation
instead of the likely death penalty or life in prison that she would have
received had the trial been allowed. This case shows a particularly
interesting series of events. The crime is committed, the public speaks out
against the defendant, the prosecution recognizes the popular opinion but
decides not only to provide the defendant with a plea bargain but also to
defend the choice by claiming experience.
These two cases are alike in many ways. In both cases, the facts are
similar and the public calls for retribution, but in the end it is the Worcester
prosecutors that pay attention to the public and the Connecticut prosecutors
that dismiss them.

Table 3: Comparing Prosecutorial Actions in Cases Where “Murder of a
Child By a Non-Stranger”
Facts
Public’s
Prosecutor’s
Sentence
Response
Response
-beat child to No support
case
12 years in
Worcester
death
for defendant prosecuted
prison, 7
(Lepkowski)
-initial
years
confusion of
probation
facts
-murdered
No support
plea bargain
16 years in
Hartford
child by
for defendant
prison, 5
(Torres)
swinging him
years
in sleeping
probation
bag
-initial
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confusion of
facts

CONCLUSION
This study sought to determine if selection methods of prosecutors affect
their decision to prosecute criminal cases. The evidence in this case study
suggests that they do.
Two cities with different selection methods were chosen, Hartford,
Connecticut (appointment) and Worcester, Massachusetts (election). For each
city, three cases were selected based on their “high-profile” status. Each case
was examined for public sentiment, the prosecutor’s recognition of that
sentiment and then the prosecutor’s final decision. It was hypothesized that
prosecutors who are elected are more likely to follow public sentiment since
they seek reelection while prosecutors who are appointed are less likely to
follow public sentiment since they do not seek reelection.
Using the above methodology, it was determined that this hypothesis is
valid for these cases. In Worcester it was expected that the District Attorney
would follow public sentiment. For all three cases this was true. In the
Ventola case, the public called for forgiveness and the prosecutors responded
by allowing a plea bargain. In the Nazario case, the public called for
retribution and so Nazario was not given a plea deal. In the Lepkowski case,
the public again asked for retribution and so the prosecution responded by
taking the case to trial. In each of these cases the Worcester prosecutors paid
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close attention to the public sentiment surrounding each case. Not only was
this apparent in their final decisions, but in their statements given to the
media and in court.
In Hartford, it was hypothesized that the State Attorney would not be
concerned with the public sentiment surrounding a case. This was
determined to be valid for two out of three cases. In the Boyko case, the
public wanted Boyko to pay for his crimes. While the prosecution recognized
the public sentiment, they ignored it and gave Boyko a lesser sentence via
plea bargain. In the Torres case, it was clear that the public was not
forgiving of her crimes. The prosecution, however, did not pay attention to
this sentiment and allowed Torres to take a plea bargain. The one case that
stood out was the Lacouture case. Lacouture seemed to have full public
support for his case. Prosecutors recognized the support and so they allowed
him to accept a plea bargain. In two of these cases it was clear that the
prosecutors were not concerned with gaining public support. However, there
was one outlier that suggested appointed prosecutors might sometimes pay
attention to the public.
Additional support for the hypothesis that selection methods matter in
the use of discretion was found in other variables throughout this case study.
Through examining each case found in the media, it was readily observed that
prosecutor presence was much more prevalent in the Worcester cases than in
the Hartford cases. Though there were quotes from at least one prosecutor in
each case, in the Worcester cases the quotes were not only more abundant,
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but on numerous occasions the District Attorney himself gave some of the
most powerful statements on the case. This was not found in the Hartford
cases. In the Hartford cases, the presence of the State’s Attorney was only
seen through her representation by the Assistant District Attorneys.
This same difference was also discovered when information was sought
out on the Internet. Brief information about Gail Hardy was mentioned on
the Connecticut Government website, while District Attorney Early had an
entire web site devoted to his cases and other projects. These differences
point toward the conclusion made by this study. The District Attorney that
would eventually seek reelection put himself in the media and made himself
available to the public as to encourage them to vote for him in his reelection.
(In Fact, District Attorney Early was reelected in 2010). The District Attorney
that did not seek a vote and instead enjoyed appointment was not made
available to the public and did not have to prove herself to the public.
While this study found a relationship between selection methods and
discretion, it does not claim to be a causal study. The limitations of this study
do not allow for an absolute conclusion. Instead, it asserts that there is a
relationship between these two variables and that the next step would be to
examine this topic further. A study that uses this same methodology but
examines a much greater number of cases to determine if the pattern still
holds would be able to assert a stronger relationship between the variables. A
study that could provide this same evidence but also interview the
prosecutors may also provide more insight into this topic. The ability to
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expand these findings to all of the districts in the states would also provide
additional insight. Finally, a study that focuses on cases in the present would
be more open to interviews with the community and prosecutors. These are
just a few ways that this study could be expanded for future research, but
were not done so at present due to time constraints.
The trends present in the findings in Hartford and Worcester suggest
implications for the criminal justice system. The first implications on the
criminal justice system is found in Herbert Packer’s “Two Models of the
Criminal Process.” As explained earlier, the “Two Models of the Criminal
Process” is the thought that there are two models present in the criminal
justice system and those models are Due Process and Crime Control. The due
process model suggests that the prosecutors must work for the defendant to
make sure there are no mistakes in the case that could cause a wrongful
conviction (Packer 7). The crime control model suggests that prosecutors
must be concerned with getting criminals off the street and that they must
push cases through the system in the most efficient way possible (Packer 4).
These two models are present in the criminal justice system and are in
constant competition.
When applying Packer’s model to the United States court system, the
ideal scenario is that there is an even balance of both the crime control and
due process models. Too much or too little of either model offsets the
criminal justice system and has the opportunity to damage justice. For
instance, if the system were to only focus on due process, cases would rarely
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ever be prosecuted. If the facts of a case were ever in question, the
prosecution would have to stop what they were doing and make one hundred
percent sure that the facts and evidence were perfect in order to move
forward. This would not do the country well since criminals would hardly
ever be sentenced. If the system were only focused on crime control there
would be more of a chance for innocent people to go to prison. Prosecutors
would have the opportunity to prosecute anyone without taking certain
precautions to protect that person. In the United States, neither of these
methods would be considered justice. However, combined they have the
chance to bring about fair results.
From Packer’s “Two Models of the Criminal Process,” the following
question must be asked about this case study: Do the selection methods of
prosecutors interfere with the balance that provides us with justice? In both
Hartford and Worcester there were instances where it was probable that
justice was averted because of selection methods.
Beginning with Worcester, the Ventola and Nazario cases seemed to be
the most balanced with respect to due process and crime control. In the
Ventola case, the public lobbied strongly for a less harsh sentence and the
prosecutor listened to that lobbying. What does this say for the way in which
justice was provided? Should the District Attorney have been more concerned
about crime control in a case where the facts made it clear that the man
murdered his wife? In this case, it appeared that the prosecutor saw an
opportunity. The public was very vocal about their opinion to show mercy
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for Joe Ventola and so the prosecutor went with a sentence that was slightly
reduced. In doing so he reduced the life sentence to life with parole in 15
years. Though this was a reduced sentence, considering Ventola’s age, the
sentence suited the crime well. In this case, it could have been suggested that
the prosecutors let due process take the back seat in order to secure the
District Attorney the popular vote, however this was one of the more just
outcomes.
In the Nazario case, the prosecutor again followed public sentiment and
imposed a harsh crime control penalty. Does this mean that due process was
averted in the process? This may have been the case since only estimates
were given as to the number of children he molested. Since the due process
model says all of the facts must be certain then this may have been a
violation. However, the prosecution was also provided with hard evidence
that Nazario was not innocent. The prosecution obtained his diary and an
admission of the crimes. Therefore, this was another instance where it was
likely that crime control and due process were applied fairly.
In the Lepkowski case, however, there were more concerning issues.
The prosecution charged Michelle Lepkowski with the murder of her child
since the public called for retribution. For this case, it seemed likely that the
murder charge was an act by the prosecution to gain public support. It was
made clear in the media that the facts of the case were not exact. In fact,
some of the articles suggest that Lepkowski’s boyfriend was the one
responsible for the crime. According to the due process model, it was not all
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right for the prosecution to continue this case in the assertive way that they
did. Further evidence that the choice to go for a harsh crime control sentence
was just for the public comes from the conviction that the jury assigned
Lepkowski. The jury did not find her guilty of murder, but convicted her of
manslaughter, a lesser charge. It is cases like these that need to be
questioned.
Though the majority of the cases from Worcester seemed to provide a
good balance of crime control and due process, the Lepkowski case proved
that it was possible for some cases to slip through the cracks. The Lepkowski
case suggested that selection methods were important in Worcester and that
because elections were important justice might not always be provided.
The Hartford cases also brought up some questions about the fairness of
crime control and due process. In Hartford, the Lacouture case was the one
that seemed able to keep a balance of crime control and due process.
Lacouture was charged with murdering his wife but received wide public
support from people who claim he was a good husband and his wife had
mental issues. Though it was obvious that Lacouture murdered his wife, the
prosecution granted him a plea bargain based on the public’s support for him
and the fact that his wife was not mentally well. Though the plea bargain
suggested that this was solely a crime control outcome, the other facts of the
case, including the mental health of his wife suggested that this was a fair
outcome.
The other two cases that came out of Hartford suggested a more
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significant imbalance between crime control and due process. First was the
Boyko case. Boyko was charged with molesting two girls over a long period
of time. The public and even the prosecutors recognized that this was a case
that needed to be prosecuted. Instead of prosecuting, however, Boyko was
given a plea, which let him off easily and secured the conviction for the
prosecution. This was an abuse of the Crime Control Model since the
prosecution was able to secure the conviction even when that conviction
might not have been the correct choice. This decision was made possible by
the lack of accountability of the prosecutors to the public. Because they were
able to use their discretion so liberally, crime control was not upheld. The
same outcome occurred in the Torres case. Torres was charged with
murdering the child she was babysitting. The public was appalled by the way
in which the child was murdered. Instead of providing the public with
retribution, the prosecutors used their discretion to their advantage and
offered a plea bargain, which means they did not have to go to trial but were
able to secure a conviction. Once again, crime control was a priority. The
Hartford cases suggested that justice was second best to what the prosecutors
wanted to do with the case.
A final question then is if anything should be done about selection
methods? Since a majority of states have switched to electing their
prosecutors it seems as if the remaining states should also switch. But maybe
there is something valuable in appointing prosecutors that the other states
have overlooked. Which is the better option? In determining this question
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there are two competing theories. One is that the public is informed and
knows enough about the law that they can make educated decision and hold
prosecutors accountable for what they do. The other is that the general
public does not know enough about the system and therefore prosecutors
should not be held accountable to the public. Clearly, the majority of states
have chosen to abide by the former thought.
In determining which selection method is the best, this study suggests
that each of these selection methods has their advantages and disadvantages.
As is seen in the Worcester cases, it is possible for prosecutors to take their
vote into consideration when they should be focusing on the case. In the
Hartford cases, it is possible that the prosecutors will do what they think is
best and ignore the community’s desires. In both cities it is apparent that in
one way or another either crime control or due process is going to suffer at
some point.
Since crime control and due process will tend to suffer in both cities, it is
important to look at the benefits that each of these selection methods
provides. In Worcester, there may be an imbalance between crime control
and due process, but that also means that the public is being represented. In
Hartford, when there is a crime control and due process imbalance, the public
officials use their expertise to make decisions. The benefits that come out of
each of these cities are very different. In Worcester, there is an emphasis on
accountability and transparency. In Hartford, there is a lack of
accountability and transparency. Since crime control and due process are
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likely to fall out of balance in each city, the decision of which selection
method is best comes down to personal preference. Would you rather trust
public officials or would you rather monitor their every move?
Finally, this study makes a similar conclusion as that of previous
scholars. The
criminal justice system is, in fact, a “system” and the prosecutors are just a
piece of that system (Cole; Miller). There are so many factors that go into a
prosecutor’s decision that it is impossible to say which factor determines how
a prosecutor will handle a case. This study suggests that selection methods
account for a larger portion of that system.
The literature on this topic points to the fact that prosecutors have a
significant amount of discretion at their disposal (Angela Davis; Kenneth
Davis). Scholars suggest that there is a system at work and that factors like
relationships, conviction rates and the community play a role in the
prosecutor’s use of discretion (Cole; Miller). Studies, however, fail to
determine which factor has the most influence on a prosecutor’s decisions.
They also fail to examine the relationship between prosecutors and their
selection status. These two topics are combine in this study to determine that
there are differences in how prosecutors use discretion based on selection
status and that the reason for that is their level of responsiveness to the
community. The way in which prosecutors address the community in their
decisions on criminal cases is one of the main reasons why prosecutors choose
to prosecute the way they do.
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